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Summary 
In this paper we develop a model to analyze, in a dynamic framework, how countries 
join international environmental agreements (IEAs). In the model, where countries 
suffer from the same environmental damage as a result of the total global emissions, a 
non-signatory country decides its emissions by maximizing its own welfare, whereas a 
signatory country decides its emissions by maximizing the aggregate welfare of all 
signatory countries. Signatory countries are assumed to be able to punish the non-
signatories at a cost. When countries decide on their pollution emissions they account 
for the evolution of the pollution over time. Moreover, we propose a mechanism to 
describe how countries reach a stable IEA. The model is able to capture situations with 
partial cooperation in an IEA stable over time. It also captures situations where all 
countries participate in a stable agreement, or situations where no stable agreement is 
feasible. When more than one possibility coexists, the long-term outcome of the game 
depends on the initial conditions (i.e. the size of the initial group of signatory countries 
and the pollution level). 
 
Keywords: International Environmental Agreements, Non‐Cooperative Dynamic Game, 
Coalition Stability 
 
JEL Classification: C73, Q53 
 
This research was supported by FQRSC. We would like to thank Henry Tulkens and the 
participants at the 13th Coalition Theory Network Workshop for their useful comments. 
This paper was presented at the 13th Coalition Theory Network Workshop organised by 








Address for correspondence: 
 
Michèle Breton  
HEC Montréal 
3000, chemin de la Côte-Sainte-Catherine 
H3T 2A7 Montréal (Québec) 
Canada  
Phone: (514) 340 6490  
Fax:  (514) 340 6432 
E-mail: michele.breton@hec.ca 1
1 Introduction
Environmental problems often share the feature of being international, that is, the welfare of
a country depends not only on its own policy, but also on those of other countries. Examples
of these problems are acid rains, pollution emissions, exploitation of the ﬁshing grounds or
rain forests. In the case of pollution emissions, air pollutants mix in the atmosphere and
additions to the concentrations of these gases depend on the global total emissions. Countries
have realized that these kinds of problems have to be solved on a global basis and that
international environmental agreements (IEAs) are the only solutions.
The participation of countries in an international agreement to improve the quality of
the environment is a complex question for two main reasons. First, countries are sovereign
and their participation to international agreements is voluntary. There is no supra-national
authority that forces countries to participate to an agreement, as well as there is no inter-
national environmental judicial system powerful enough to guarantee compliance to an IEA
[17, 36, 19]. Second, each country may have an incentive to free-ride. In fact, while the costs
for reducing emissions are carried out exclusively by the country that is taking action, the
beneﬁts of a reduction in emissions are shared by all countries, so that each country has the
incentive to wait for the others to reduce their emissions. This problem is commonly known
as “The Tragedy of the Commons” [22].
Because of these interactions, global environmental problems can be modeled in a game
theoretic framework. The literature based on this approach has developed following two
streams: the cooperative and the non-cooperative approach. In this paper, we adopt the
non-cooperative point of view; the main concept, in this case, is that players cannot make
binding agreements and they act as rivals and in their own best interest,1 so that successful
agreements must be self-enforcing [1].The conditions for an agreement to be self-enforcing are
proﬁtability, which ensures that the accession to the agreement is individually rational for a
country, and stability, which ensures that the group of signatory countries is an equilibrium.
The main body of literature on non-cooperative games and self-enforcing agreements uses
a static framework to describe the problem of pollution emissions, that is, the environmental
damage is assumed to depend on the ﬂow of emissions. In this literature following [1], two
conditions deﬁne an equilibrium: internal stability, which implies that no member has an
incentive to leave the agreement, and external stability, which implies that no non-member has
an incentive to join the agreement. Behind these concepts, there is the idea that governments
can re-optimize their choice, but in static models, this is only hypothetical, because since the
game will not be played again, there is no adjustment towards a stable solution and no change
of state. In this framework, several stages in which speciﬁc decisions have to be made can
be considered; a typical example is a two-stage game, where countries decide wether or not
to become a member of an IEA in the ﬁrst stage (membership game), and decide on their
emissions in the second stage (emissions game).
Many static models using this stability concept have reached the conclusion that successful
cooperation among a large number of countries is diﬃcult to obtain, and that the size of the
membership of a stable IEA is inversely related to the relative importance of the environmen-
tal damage. In order to explain the greater participation observed in reality, like for exam-
1Cooperative game theory assumes that players realize that, if they act as a group and coordinate their
actions, they can obtain mutual beneﬁts. A particular agreement is the result of questions about the circum-
stances under which the agreement can be established, what can be achieved as a group, and the ways in which
the beneﬁts of the cooperation are redistributed among the participants [14, 36].2
ple in the Montreal Protocol,2 static models have incorporated several ideas to increase the
propensity to cooperate. Some of them are: Stackelberg leadership of signatories [2, 13, 34],
transfers [10, 23], reputation eﬀects [23, 24, 8], issue linkages [6, 7, 3, 25, 11, 12, 28], including
a minimum participation clause [9], and considering modest emission reduction targets [20].
Although any model abstracts from reality, static games applied to pollution emissions
and IEAs may be criticized on two important aspects. One aspect is the stock externality:
transboundary environmental damage is usually related to the accumulation (stock) of pollu-
tion, rather than to the emissions (ﬂow). The second aspect is that countries can revise their
decisions of being or not member of an agreement at diﬀerent points in time, especially if the
environmental damage is changing over time.
In the literature considering the dynamics of the pollution stock, the concepts of renego-
tiation-proof or dynamically consistent agreements may be conceptually linked to internal and
external stability conditions, in the context of repeated and dynamic games respectively. Part
of this literature develops diﬀerential games that compare diﬀerent solution concepts without
addressing the membership problem (see for instance [27, 30, 15, 16] and [32] ). Papers
considering the membership decision include [33, 21], and [31]. In [33], the membership
game is played once and forever and, on the basis of this result, signatory and non-signatory
countries decide their emissions by solving an inﬁnite-horizon diﬀerential game in both open-
loop and feedback strategies. Thus, the dynamics of the pollution stock only aﬀects the
emissions strategies but not the IEA membership. In [21], a transfer scheme is proposed in a
dynamic game such that full cooperation is maintained over time. In this case, the dynamics
of the stock pollutant is included in the membership decision, but the transfer scheme is
able to ensure full cooperation so that the size of the IEA membership does not change over
time. Finally in [31] the formation and stability of IEAs over time is studied in a diﬀerence
game with dynamic pollution stock. In each period, countries solve both an emission game
and a membership game so that the number of signatories changes over time with the stock
of pollution. The authors assume an upper bound on non-signatory emissions. They also
suppose that, in each period, signatories are randomly selected, so that the stability concept
is the equality of the welfare of signatories and non-signatories.3 The result is the existence
of a unique steady-state of pollution stock to which corresponds a steady-state for the size of
a stable IEA. As in the static case, the size of the self-enforcing IEA is negatively related to
the importance of the damage costs.
In this paper, we recognize that countries can joint or quit an agreement over time and
that it takes time to reach a stable IEA, so that we propose a possible mechanism which
could describe how this happens. We choose a discrete time setting because, even if pollution
evolves continuously over time, decisions from countries whether to enter or leave an IEA are
rather made at discrete moments.
The agreement we model in this paper includes two aspects. The ﬁrst one is that a
signatory country agrees to decide its emissions level by maximizing the aggregate welfare of
the coalition. Instead, a non-signatory country decides its emissions level by maximizing its
individual welfare. In each case, countries use the total discounted welfare over an inﬁnite
horizon, taking into account the evolution of the pollution stock. The second aspect is that
a signatory country agrees to punish non-signatory countries. In particular, we assume that
the punishment is a function of the number of signatory countries, as in Hoel and Schneider
[23], but also of the level of the accumulated pollution. This non-environmental cost suﬀered
2The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer signed in 1987 at present counts 191
nations.
3This means that the incentive for a signatory to abide by its agreement is not addressed in the model.3
by non-signatories can be interpreted as a trade sanction (e.g. a carbon tax), or a social
norm, which becomes stronger with increasing levels of pollution and environmental damage.
Including some sort of punishment in an IEA as a tool to increase and sustain cooperation
is not uncommon [4, 3]. Indeed, the Montreal Protocol, among the other measures to boost
participation to the agreement, includes trade sanctions against non-members (banning trade
between signatories and non-signatories).
Moreover, since a general punishment or, more speciﬁcally, a trade sanction is not with-
out adverse consequences, we also include another element in the model that has not been
addressed to the best of our knowledge in the context of IEA to reduce pollution emissions,
that is, a cost suﬀered by signatory countries for punishing the non-signatories (as in [35] and
[5] in the ﬁshery context). We assume this cost to be proportional to the punishment.
Finally, we propose an evolutionary process that may describe how countries reach over
time a stable IEA. This process is able to depict the stickiness and delays that may char-
acterize this convergence. This idea of gradually achieving stability ﬁnds its justiﬁcation in
practice: often, an IEA is promoted and signed by a ﬁrst group of founding countries (for
some reason more sensitive to the environmental problem) and it is then joined over time by
other countries.4 An example is the Montreal Protocol which, after being ratiﬁed by a ﬁrst
group of countries, was joined by new members every year.
In particular, we adopt a replicator dynamics in discrete-time which provides evolutionary
pressures in favor of group obtaining the highest payoﬀ. Following the spirit of evolutionary
games, the group that performs better is joined by a fraction of new agents. The adjustment
speed at which countries switch to the superior strategy is related to the diﬀerence in welfare,
and it reﬂects the “psychological” or “physical” cost of changing behavior. The evolutionary
process ends in an IEA which is stable over time and at the steady-state pollution stock. It is
worthwhile noticing that in that process, the evolution of players’ welfare over time depends
not only on the dynamics of emissions and pollution, but also on the evolution of the diﬀerent
groups’ composition.
Our model is able to capture diﬀerent long-run situations: that no stable agreement is
reached, that all countries joint the agreement, and the (more realistic) result in which some
countries are in, and others are out, of a stable IEA.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and the general dynamics
that governs the evolution of pollution stock. In Section 3, we propose and solve a dynamic
game in which countries optimize their welfare over an inﬁnite horizon by taking into account
the evolution of the pollution stock. Section 4 introduces stability concepts and the replicator
dynamics for the number of signatory countries. Section 5 presents numerical illustrations
and sensitivity analysis. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
Let us consider N identical countries. A fraction s of them, identiﬁed as “signatory countries”,
decides to join an international environmental agreement, according to which their production
activity is decided by maximizing the aggregate welfare of the coalition. We denote S the
set of signatory countries. The remaining fraction (1 − s), identiﬁed as “non-signatory coun-
tries” or “defectors”, acts individually, that is each of them decides its production activity by
maximizing its individual welfare, and we denote D the set of defectors.
4Of course, it may also happen that a member country decides to abandon the agreement.4
Each country has a production activity that generates beneﬁts but also pollution. Let us
indicate with ejt the emissions generated by the production of country j in time period t.
We suppose that the net revenues (i.e., gross revenues minus costs) derived from country j’s
production activity in a given period are increasing concave functions of its emissions, and









Countries suﬀer an environmental damage arising from (global) pollution, which is assumed
linear5 and given by
D(Pt) = dPt,
where d > 0 is the constant marginal damage and Pt is the stock of pollution at time t.
As part of the agreement, we assume that each signatory country has to punish a non-
signatory for its irresponsible behavior ([23]). Moreover, we suppose that this punishment is
directly proportional to the level of pollution, reﬂecting an environmental concern of signato-
ries increasing with pollution stock, so that the non-environmental cost incurred by a defector
as punishment is given by
φ(s,Pt) = αNsPt.
This sanction can be interpreted as a limited trade with a non-signatory country, or a carbon-
tax imposed on its exports. In the following we assume that α < d, that is, the punishment
inﬂicted on a non-member country from an individual signatory is small with respect to the
damage it suﬀers from pollution.
As punishing a country has some negative eﬀect on signatory countries, we suppose that
punishing has itself a cost, which is proportional to the punishment αPt imposed to the
N (1 − s) non-signatory countries,6 so that each signatory incurs in a non-environmental cost
given by
ω(s,Pt) = γN (1 − s)Pt,
where one would normally expect γ < α.7 As a consequence, the welfare of a signatory
country j ∈ S in time period t is given by
WS






− dPt − γN (1 − s)Pt,
whereas the welfare of a non-signatory j ∈ D is given by
WD






− dPt − αNsPt.
In the sequel, we will use the following convenient abbreviated notation
cS ≡ d + γN (1 − s)
cD ≡ d + αNs
5This simpliﬁcation is not uncommon (see for example [23, 20] and is supported by some empirical estima-
tions (see [26]).
6The marginal cost of punishing is assumed to be independent from the number of signatory countries. This
is the case for example for a trade sanction: the cost on a member’s welfare depends only on the number of
countries to which it applies the sanctions.
7Notice that the results are not aﬀected if this is not the case.5
to represent the marginal (environmental and non-environmental) impacts of pollution on
the welfare of signatory and non-signatory countries respectively (which are however not
constants, but linear functions of s). Notice that the diﬀerence in marginal costs cS −cD is a
linear function of s which is positive for s <
γ
α+γ and negative for s >
γ
α+γ.
Finally, the evolution over time of the pollution stock is assumed to be governed by the
discrete time equation







where δ ∈ (0,1) is the natural decay,
 
i∈S eit is the total emissions of signatory countries and  
k∈D ekt is the total emissions of non-signatories both at time period t.
3 A dynamic game of emissions
In this section, we solve the dynamic emissions game. We assume that, for a given ﬁxed
number of signatories, countries optimize their welfare by taking into account the evolution
of the stock of pollution. The total discounted welfare of players is maximized over an inﬁnite
horizon, where β is the one-period discount factor assumed common to all players. The welfare

























ekt, P0 given, (2)
where ejt is the emissions of country j during period t and ej denotes the sequence of emissions



















In order to characterize the optimal reaction strategies of players and the dynamic equi-
librium, we use a dynamic programming formulation where the state variable is P, that is
the level of pollution of the preceding time period. We solve for a Nash equilibrium in sta-
tionary feedback strategies between the group of signatories, acting as a single player, and
the non-signatories, acting as N(1 − s) individual players, where Ns ∈ [1,N − 1]. We call κ




1 − β(1 − δ)
≥ 1.
We ﬁrst compute the optimal reaction of the set of signatory countries to a given sta-
tionary strategy vector for the defectors, denoting ED(P) the resulting total emissions of
non-signatory countries as a function of P. For each signatory country the value function
8A value of κ = 1 corresponds to myopic limiting cases, with either β = 0 (no value for the future) or δ = 1
(no stock accumulation).6
V S(P;ED) represents the optimal total welfare of a signatory country given ED(P), and it
satisﬁes











P (1 − δ) + Nse + ED (P)
 
cS (3)
+βV S  
P (1 − δ) + Nse + ED(P);ED  
.
Proposition 1 The value function of a signatory country is linear in P. The optimal reaction
of signatory countries is independent of the level of pollution and the strategy of the defectors,
and it is given by
eS = b − NsκcS, (4)
assuming b > NsκcS.
Proof. Assume that V S(P;ED) = kS − mSP. Then, ﬁrst order suﬃcient conditions yield





which achieves the maximum in (3) and which does not depend on P or ED (P). Replac-
ing eS in (3) we obtain an expression linear in P that veriﬁes our assumption. It is now
straightforward to get by identiﬁcation











The optimal emissions of a signatory country are therefore
eS = b − NsκcS.
Notice that the emissions of signatory countries endogenize the damage of the entire coali-
tion and they are convex in s. It is then immediate to compute the total emissions of signatory
countries as ES = Ns(b − NsκcS).
In the same way, we now express the optimal reaction of a defector to a given stationary
strategy vector of the other countries, denoting by Ed(P) the total emissions of all other
non-signatory countries as a function of P, and by ES the total emissions of the signatory
countries. The value function V D of a defector country represents the optimal total welfare


















P (1 − δ) + ES + e + Ed (P);ES,Ed
  
.
Proposition 2 The value function for a defector country is linear in P. The optimal reaction
of non-member countries is independent of the level of pollution and the strategy of the other
players, and it is given by
eD = b − κcD, (6)
assuming b > κcD.7
Proof. Assume that V D(P;ES,Ed) = kD − mDP. Then, ﬁrst order suﬃcient conditions
yield
eD = b − cD − mDβ.
Substituting eD in (5) we obtain a linear function of P and




2b − κcD + 2
 




so that the optimal emissions for a defector country are
eD = b − κcD.
Notice that the optimal emissions9 of a defector are linear decreasing in s, independent
of P and of the strategies of the other players. It is then immediate to compute the total
emissions of the other defector countries as Ed = (N − Ns − 1)(b − κcD).









cD (1 − s) + Ns2cS
  
.
Notice that the consequence of assuming a constant marginal environmental damage is that
the optimal emissions of countries are independent of each other (orthogonal free-riding), but
they are still linked because they are both functions of s.
It is straightforward to verify in the same way that the full defection equilibrium, where

















subject to (2) can be obtained by setting s either to 0 in (5); Similarly the cooperative solution,


















subject to to (2) can be obtained by setting s to 1 in (3). We extend the domain of the value
functions in the obvious way: when s = 0, V D represents the total discounted welfare and
eD the equilibrium strategy of the players when there is no coalition, and when s = 1, V S
represents the total discounted welfare and eS the optimal strategy of the players under full
cooperation.
Replacing (4) and (6) in (1), the dynamics of the pollution stock becomes




cD (1 − s) + Ns2cS
  
. (7)










and the individual current (one-period) welfares and total discounted welfares of a signatory

































4 Evolution and stability of IEAs
We now state conditions characterizing a stable coalition for a given level of pollution stock,
using two alternative stability concepts representing diﬀerent degrees of rationality. We then
propose a discrete-time replicator dynamics for the proportion of signatories that will allow
players to reach a stable IEA in the long run.
4.1 Limited rationality
The limited rationality equilibrium concept requires the equality of signatories’ and non-
signatories’ welfares. This concept is used in [31], where the authors justify it by saying that,
in each period, there is a random process for determining which countries become signatories.
In our case, it can be explained by bounded rationality of the players: when current welfares
are equal, players observe that the members of the other group do not fare better, and they
are not tempted to switch. Under this assumption, the necessary condition for an IEA with
Ns ∈ [1,N − 1] signatories to be stable when the stock of pollution is ¯ P is obtained by
equating (9) and (10)10 so that we get
¯ P (1 − δ) + E(s) =
κ2 (cD − NscS)(cD + NscS)
2(cS − cD)
. (13)
It is interesting to note that for Ns ∈ [1,N − 1], the pollution stock ¯ P (1 − δ)+E(s) where
that condition is satisﬁed is positive when cS < cD < NscS. As a consequence, if it exists, a
stable IEA necessarily has s ≥
γ
γ+α, and defectors emitting more than signatories. Notice also
that at the steady-state pollution, ¯ P = P∗(s), equality of current welfares implies equality of
total discounted welfares.
10If we rather require equality of total discounted welfares at ¯ P, the stability condition becomes
¯ P (1 − δ)(1 − β) + E(s) =
κ(cD−NscS)(cD+NscS)
2(cS−cD) .9
4.2 Unilateral deviation and foresight
The second equilibrium concept is a dynamic version of the one introduced by [1] and widely
used in static games. It assumes that each player is able to compare his welfare with what
he would achieve if he unilaterally switched group. In a dynamic context where the players’
criterion is total discounted welfare, the conditions for internal and external stability become
respectively







,P) < V D(s,P).
Since these two conditions are continuous in s, it is easy to show that a necessary condition
for stability of an IEA with ⌈Ns⌉ signatories when the stock of pollution is ¯ P is given by:
¯ P (1 − β)(1 − δ) = κ
N2s2c2
S − (cD − α)
2 (2N (1 − s) + 1)
2(cS − cD + α)
−κ
NcScD (1 − s) + (cS + γ)(cD − α)(Ns − 1)
2
(cS − cD + α)
− Nb. (14)
4.3 Dynamics
As the pollution stock changes over time, the number of signatories required for a stable IEA
also changes. One could assume, as in [31] for instance, that in each period, the number of
signatories satisﬁes the stability condition (13) or (14) at Pt; in practice, this would require
at each time period either an exogenous intervention or some time-consuming negociation
process.




stwS(st,Pt) + (1 − st)wD(st,Pt)
. (15)
where wS(st,Pt) and wD(st,Pt) are given by (9) and (10) and assumed non-negative.11 Let






σL(st,Pt) if σL(st,Pt) ∈ (0,1)
0 if σL(st,Pt) ≤ 0
1 if σL(st,Pt) ≥ 1
(16)
The denominator of (15) represents a weighted average of the welfares observed in period t,
where the weights are given by the current proportions of the two types of countries.
11It is straightforward to adapt the adjustment mechanism if the welfare of one or both groups of players is
negative.
12The replicator dynamics in continuous time is commonly used in the context of common pool resource
games and, in particular, in the ﬁsheries to describe the evolution of a population of agents where two behaviors
can be adopted [[35, 29, 18]for instance]. In [37], the replicator dynamics is used to model participation and
compliance of ﬁrms to voluntary environmental agreements.10
Whenever the current welfare obtained from one type of behavior is higher than the other,
a fraction of countries will switch behavior and join the group that is performing better.
This equation captures the notion that a strategy yielding proﬁts above (below) the average
increases (decreases) in share in the population13 and that the “speed” of change depends on
the relative welfare inequalities. This update mechanism ensures that the change in shares is
a gradual process, showing that there might be some delays or inertia for countries to readjust
their behavior, due for instance to an intangible or political cost of switching.
In this case, (7) and (15)-(16) give rise to a two-dimensional dynamic system that describes
the evolution, over time, of the stock of pollution and proportion of signatories. It is easy to
check that a steady-state (s∗,P∗) of this dynamic system satisﬁes the stability conditions for
an IEA at ¯ P = P∗(s∗) where we assume countries with limited rationality.















1 if σU(st,Pt) ≥ 1
0 if σU(st,Pt) ≤ 1
N.
(18)
Now, the two-dimensional dynamic system (7) and (17)-(18) describes the evolution over
time of both the stock of pollution and the proportion of signatories. Players reach a stable
IEA by comparing “current” total discounted welfares when staying in or leaving unilaterally
a coalition, that is, without taking into account the dynamics of s.
5 Steady-state and sensitivity analysis
We now study the dynamics of the pollution and of countries’ shares under the two types
of behavior. In particular, we are interested in ﬁnding whether or not full cooperation,
coexistence of cooperators and defectors, or no cooperation at all are possible outcomes of
this model, and under what conditions they eventually occur. In our numerical simulations,
we use parameter values that give rise to positive individual emissions. The results obtained
under the two stability concepts are qualitatively similar.
When they exist, equilibrium steady-state values of the stock of pollution and the pro-
portion of signatory countries are indexed by υ and we denote ξυ = (sυ,Pυ) an equilibrium
steady-state of the dynamic system (7)–(15) or (7)–(17).
We ﬁrst notice that the boundary equilibria ξn, corresponding to sn = 0, and ξc, corre-














13This idea is not uncommon in economics. For example, when new strategies or technologies are introduced
on the market, ﬁrms will tend to imitate the most successful ones, or the ones that yields a ‘satisﬁcing’ level
of proﬁts. Here, we assume that governments follow the same kind of behavior.11
where Pn > Pc. The dynamic system may also reach inner steady-states corresponding to
IEAs with partial cooperation.
5.1 Partial cooperation
According to the value of the parameters, 0, 1 or 2 coexisting inner steady-states may appear
corresponding to situations where the necessary condition for stability is satisﬁed at the
steady-state pollution. These are deﬁned by the intersections of P∗(s) with ¯ P(s). When two
inner steady-states exist, the one with the lower percentage of signatory countries, denoted
ξl, is a saddle point14 and the one with the higher percentage of signatory countries, denoted
ξh, is a stable node, corresponding to a stable IEA with partial cooperation. Figures 1–3
illustrate in the (s,P) plane three representative examples, and how these situations may
appear when the values of parameters α and γ are changed. These examples are generated
under the limited rationality criterion. The unilateral deviation hypothesis generate stable
IEAs with a slightly higher level of cooperation, and with slightly wider basins of attraction.
Figure 1 illustrates the impact of an increase in the punishment α. In Figure 1a (with
α = 0.000295), functions P∗ and ¯ P do not intersect: there is no value of s such that the
stability criterion is satisﬁed at the steady-state pollution stock. From any initial conditions
(s0,P0), the replicator dynamics converges to s = 0, that is, no feasible agreement is possible.
In Figure 1b (with α = 0.000305), if the initial group of signatory countries is large enough
(that is, if the initial conditions are in the blue area), then the steady-state ξh is reached,
corresponding to a stable IEA with partial cooperation. An interesting observation is that
the minimum size of the initial number of signatories which leads to the inner steady-state is
decreasing with the initial pollution stock (see Figure 2 for a zoom-in).
In general, an increase of α decreases both P∗(s) and ¯ P(s); it determines a higher level
of cooperation and a lower level of pollution at the steady-state, and it enlarges the basin of
initial states generating trajectories converging to ξh. In Figure 1c (with α = 0.000337), there
is no interior value of s yielding a stable IEA at the steady-state. Starting from any initial
condition in the green area, the system converges to ξc. Further increases in the punishment
do not have any eﬀect on the long run values of the dynamic variables, but they make the
full cooperation more robust (i.e. supported by a greater number of initial states).
Figure 3 illustrates the impact of decreasing γ, starting from the case depicted in Figure 1a
(with γ = 0.0002). A decrease in γ decreases both P∗ and ¯ P. In Figure 3a (with γ = 0.00017),
an inner steady-state with partial cooperation appears. Further decreases in γ have positive
eﬀects on the long run values of the dynamic variables (higher cooperation and lower pollution
stock), and especially on the basin of the stable steady-state (Figure 3b). This means that if
the mandatory punishment foreseen by the agreement is not too expensive, the initial group
of founding countries does not need to be very large to lead to a stable agreement. The
reduction of the cost for punising may or may not generate full cooperation depending on the
value of the other parameters (this is discussed further in Section 5.2).
Sensitivity analysis shows that, with respect to other parameters, increasing the proﬁtabil-
ity of emissions (parameter b) has a positive impact on the number of signatories at the steady
state, as well as on the set of initial states generating trajectories converging to partial or full
cooperation, however at the expense of a higher steady-state pollution stock. More interest-
ingly, an increase of the marginal environmental cost (parameter d) impacts negatively the
14Under the unilateral deviation criterion, entry and exit conditions are not satisﬁed at a saddle point. Under
the limited rationality criterion, welfares are equal at a saddle point, but this steady-state is not stable.12
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Figure 1: Impact of increasing punishment. The parameter values are: N = 100, b = 200,
d = 0.3, γ = 0.0002, δ = 0.8, β = 0.9. In (a), α = 0.000295; in (b), α = 0.000305; in (c), α =
0.000337. The red area represents the set of initial conditions of s and P generating trajectories
converging to the fully non-cooperative outcome. The blue area represents the set of initial
conditions of s and P generating trajectories converging to the partial cooperation outcome.
The green area represents the set of initial conditions of s and P generating trajectories
converging to the full cooperative outcome.














































Figure 2: Zoom in on the basin of attraction.
size of the steady state coalition as well as the size of the basin of attraction leading to it.
This result is consistent with what has been observed in static games: when the potential
gain from cooperation is large, the membership of an IEA is likely to be small. This can be
explained by the incentive to free-ride, implying that a stable IEA is the smallest one where
emitting less is welfare-enhancing.
Figure 4 represents various trajectories for the pollution stock and the number of signa-
tory countries over time, in the case depicted in Figure 1b, where an inner steady-state exists.
Depending on the initial conditions, trajectories converge either to a situation with no co-
operation, or to a stable IEA. The way this stable solution is reached also depends on the
initial condition. Possible evolutions in the space (s,P) are illustrated in Figure 5. Notice13
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Figure 3: Impact of decreasing cost for punishment. The parameter values are: N = 100,
b = 200, d = 0.3, α = 0.000295, δ = 0.8, β = 0.9. In (a), γ = 0.00017; in (b), γ = 0.00013. The
red area represents the set of initial conditions of s and P generating trajectories converging
to the fully non-cooperative outcome. The blue area represents the set of initial conditions of
s and Pgenerating trajectories converging to the partial cooperation outcome.
how evolutionary pressure increases s above ¯ P (where signatories fare better) and decreases
s otherwise.
5.2 No Cost for Punishing
We now consider the special case when enforcing a sanction does not entail any cost (as
in [23]). In this case, the marginal cost of pollution of a non-signatory country is always
higher than that of a signatory country, and a non-signatory emits more than a signatory for
s > d






negative for s ≤ 1
N. As a consequence, if punishing has no adverse consequences on coalition
members’ welfare, then there is at most one inner equilibrium with coexistence of defectors and
signatories. Moreover, the system never admits as a solution the case of complete defection,
but the dynamics converge either to an inner steady state with partial cooperation, or to a
situation with full cooperation.
5.3 No punishment
An interesting question is how the dynamic model performs when there is no punishment
(α = γ = 0). In this case, the diﬀerence between current welfares is given by
wS(s,P) − wD(s,P) = −
1
2
d2κ2 (Ns − 1)(Ns + 1)
and it is straightforward to verify that, for Ns ≥ 1and any level of pollution stock, the welfare
of signatories is always smaller than that of the non-signatories. As a consequence, under the
limited rationality criterion, no stable coalition can be attained.
On the other hand, under the unilateral deviation criterion, the exit condition




reduces to (Ns − 3)(Ns − 1) ≤ 0,14





















































































































































































































































Figure 4: Trajectories corresponding to various initial conditions. Parameters are as in Fig-
ure 1b. In panel b, the number of signatories converge to 0. In panels c, d and e, trajectories
converge to the same inner steady-state, but following diﬀerent paths depending on the initial
conditions.15
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Figure 5: Evolution of s and P.




,P) < V D(s,P)
reduces to Ns > 2.
As a consequence, for any level of pollution, the only stable IEA involves 3 members, which
corresponds to the result obtained for static games.
5.4 Endogeneous punishment
In the above analysis, we assumed that the punishment level agreed on by the signatories was
exogenous. Recognizing that the best outcome is full cooperation, it is however possible for
the initial group of signatories to compute a value for α such that full cooperation is realised
in the long run. In this case, we assume that γ = τα (the cost is proportional to the level of
punishment). If players use the unilateral deviation criterion to decide on their membership,
the smallest level α for which full cooperation is achieved at the steady state satisﬁes (14) at
¯ P = b−Ndκ
δ and s = 1, or equivalently solves





κδ (τ − 2)(N − 1) + N2  
+d2κ2δ (N − 3) = 0.
For instance, with the parameter values used in Figure 1 with τ = 0.67, one obtains α∗ =
3.16938 × 10−4.
If players use the limited rationality criterion, the smallest level of α for which full co-
operation is achieved at the steady-state satisﬁes (13) at ¯ P = b−Ndκ








− d2κ2δ (N − 1)(N + 1) = 0.16
For instance, with the parameter values used in Figure 1, one obtains α∗ = 3.2759 × 10−4.
As expected, with respect to the unilateral deviation criterion, a higher level of punishment
is required under limited rationality to achieve the same level of cooperation.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we dealt with the problem of stability of international environmental agreements
concerning pollution emissions. Stock externalities were included, as well as the possibility
for countries to abide by the agreement or to defect at any time. We considered an agreement
that includes a provision for signatory countries to punish non-signatory countries, even if
sanctioning the defectors entails a cost. We developed a model in which countries optimize
their welfare over an inﬁnite horizon, taking into account the evolution of the stock of pollu-
tion. In deﬁning a stable coalition, we applied the well known internal and external stability
conditions ([1]) but also a less sophisticated equilibrium concept that only requires the equal-
ity of the current welfares obtained by signatory and non-signatory countries. We found that
the equilibrium concept based on the unilateral deviation hypothesis generates stable IEAs
with a higher level of cooperation than the ones based on less sophisticated agents. Finally,
we proposed an evolutionary mechanism that might be used to reach a stable IEA over time.
This idea ﬁnds its validation in the real practice where conception and “growth” of an IEA
are experienced. A motivating example is the Montreal Protocol, to which many countries
joined over the last 20 years since its ratiﬁcation, showing that IEAs with high participation
do occur, and that membership in the agreement may change over time.
The main results of our numerical simulations can be summarized as follows. The outcome
with no country joining the IEA is always a solution, but, provided sanctions are strong
enough and/or cost for punishing is not too high, this outcome coexists with either a partial
cooperation solution or full cooperation. When two outcomes coexists, initial conditions are
determinant: if the initial coalition is not large enough for a given initial level of the pollution
stock, then the equilibrium solution is full defection. The basin boundary can be interpreted
as a minimum participation clause, where the minimum number of members is aﬀected by the
level of punishment included in the agreement and/or by its cost. However, the higher the
initial level of pollution, the less initial signatory countries are needed to converge to a stable
agreement, indicating that it is easier to endogenously bring other countries in the IEA when
the stock of pollution is high. Finally, as in the static models, the number of signatories in a
stable IEA is negatively related to the environmental cost or, equivalently, to the beneﬁts of
cooperation.
To complete the analysis, we considered the special case when enforcing a sanction doesn’t
entail any cost. In this case, full defection can never be observed; the only possible outcome,
independent of the initial conditions but depending on the value of the parameters, is either
partial or full cooperation. We also considered another special case excluding punishment
and we found that stable coalitions with large number of players cannot be implemented,
irrespective of the pollution stock. Finally, we observed that a punishment level ensuring that
full cooperation will be reached in the long run can be easily obtained.
Our assumption of linear environmental damage makes the problem tractable, since the
strategies of the players become independent of the state and of the other players’ actions.
A linear damage may be interpreted as a marginal approximation of the damage function by
the players. A further development is to consider a non-linear environmental damage, which
will require a numerical approach to solve for equilibrium outcomes.17
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